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TAKING CARE OF BUSINESS: A REVIEW OF
BUSINESS-RELATED CASES IN THE 1995-1996
SUPREME COURT TERM*
Barbara K. Bucholtzt

I. INTRODUCTION

Last term, the Supreme Court considered approximately forty cases t which
are most likely to impact the business community. Viewed through the prism of
these cases, the term reveals a pragmatic,2 centrist court, a moderately pro-business Court. In that regard, the Court appears to be in harmony with the electorate, because one of the defining characteristics of this fall's elections was that
while the Republicans failed to win the Presidency and failed to achieve the
overwhelming majority they sought in Congress, "corporate America" did manage to "defeat ... a host of state ballot initiatives that were intended to circumscribe... [business activity] ... .3
In California, for example, voters defeated Proposition 211 which was
designed to facilitate shareholder access to the courts, and thereby dilute the
effect of recent federal legislation which makes shareholder class action fraud
claims under federal securities laws more difficult to maintain.4
* Based on remarks delivered at the Conference, Practitioner'sGuide to the October 1995 Supreme
Court Term, at The University of Tulsa College of Law, December 6, 1996.
t Assistant Professor of Law, The University of Tulsa College of Law.
1. The cases are identified in Appendix A (a chart which is designed to give the reader some sense of
the contours that shape the current Court's jurisprudence as it relates to the business community) and Appendix B (a list of the cases and their citations) . These appendices follow this article.
Note that, while each case is categorized by field of law in Appendix A, the categorization is somewhat arbitrary-there are different ways the cases might have been categorized. For example, Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca,116 S. Ct. 494 (1995), is listed under the topical category of Bankruptcy cases, but it
is also a case involving issues of Removal and Remand, like Quackenbush v. Allstate Insurance Co., 116 S.
Ct. 1712 (1996), which is listed under the category of Civil Procedure and Jurisdiction. Quackenbush however, also involves issues of set-off, as does Citizens Bank of Maryland v. Strumpf, 116 S. Ct. 286 (1995),
which is listed as a Bankruptcy case. For that reason, several cases like Things Remembered appear in more
than one category in the chart.
2. This is not to suggest, however, that there were no skirmishes over dogmas and doctrine. See, for
example, Justice Scalia's dissents in BMW v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589 (1996), and Gasperini v. Centerfor the
Humanities, 116 S. Ct. 2211 (1996).
3. Peter Passell, Business Was a Big Winner, Too, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 7, 1996, at D-1.
4. See id. The article points out that had supporters of Proposition 211 been successful, the Proposition
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In Florida, the Save Our Everglades coalition's penny-a-pound sugar tax
proposal was defeated. The tax would have funded the restoration of the Ever-

glades.' The coalition asserted that fertilizer run-off from agribusiness sugar
cane fields was destroying the Everglade ecosystem.

Voters in Colorado, Missouri, and Montana turned down referenda to raise
the state minimum wage.7 Similarly, California voters rejected proposals to
curtail the ability of Health Maintenance Organizations ("H.M.O.s") to give

physicians financial incentives for instituting cost saving measures, including
non-treatment and the withholding of information about treatment not covered
by the H.M.O. plan.'
Thus, as we were reminded several times during the Burger Court Conference9 this past October, Supreme Court decisions are not only doctrinal, they
are also contextual. That is to say, they arise in the context of, and in some way
reflect, the socio-political and economic milieu in which they come down.
And so to say, as most commentators do, that the most recent term of the
Supreme Court was basically favorable to business interests must, to some

extent, reflect a basically pro-business mindset in society. To put it another
way, if last term's Supreme Court decisions and this fall's elections are any
measure, we have become a nation of moderate Republicans.
The cases which impacted business interests covered a broad spectrum of
substantive issues last term and some of these issues have sequels in the current
term. It will be instructive to see how the Court deals with these sequels. For
example, last term the Court in BMW v. Gore"0 dealt with the issue of whether
a punitive damages award was so large that it violated due process. In the new
term, launched October 7, the Court returned to the issue of punitive damage

would have counteracted the stringent federal requirements designed to deter "strike suits" because major
public corporations have California shareholders. See id. Thus, application of California law as to these shareholders would inure to the benefit of shareholders in all jurisdictions. The article notes that supporters of
Proposition 211 asserted that its defeat was attributable to the amount of money corporate opponents spent
proselytizing against it. See id. Other commentators have remarked that the extent of its defeat, by a margin
of 74 percent to 26 percent, suggests that genuine voter sentiment, more than an advertising blitz, accounted
for the defeat.
5. See id.
6. See id. This defeat was also credited to the amount of advertising money the sugar producers spent
in a campaign to defeat the tax proposal. The proposal lost by a much closer margin than California's Proposition 211 (54 percent to 46 percent). See id. The narrow margin lends credibility to the coalition's argument
that "Big Sugar's" war chest for a negative campaign defeated the proposal, especially in light of the fact that
Florida voters approved a pro-Environmental amendment to their constitution for the protection of the Everglades. The Florida electorate approved the amendment-which directs the legislature to require "'those who
cause water pollution' within the Everglades [to be] 'primarily responsible for paying the costs of abatement
of that pollution"' by a vote of 68 percent to 32 percent. Harvey Wasserman, Burnt Sugar (Environmental
Issues in Florida), THE NATION, Dec. 9, 1996, at 6. The anomaly may be attributable to "Big Sugar's" judgment that the tax would be a more formidable burden on business than the amendment. Wasserman suggests
that judgment was in error. See id.
7. See Passell, supra note 3.
8. See id. The article concludes by quoting Lester Brickman of Cardoza Law School, "when business
gets its act together ... it can win." Id.
9. A Symposium on the Burger Court was held at The University of Tulsa under the auspices of the
T.U. Law School on October 1-3, 1996. The Symposium was entitled "The Burger Court: Counter-Revolution
or Confirmation?"
10. 116 S. CL 1589 (1996).
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awards to consider whether punitive damage awards are taxable." Because the
Court found that they are, juries may be tempted to award higher punitives to

take the "tax bite" into account.
Another case from last term which has its sequel in the current docket,

concerns the telecommunications industry. Last term, the Court in Denver Area
Education Telecommunications Consortium v. FCC12 addressed issues relative

to the constitutionality of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992. The Act contains provisions which regulate, among other

things, "patently offensive" material on cable television. 3 This term the Court
will revisit a case it previously heard to consider the constitutionality of the
"must-carry" rules under that same 1992 Act.14

Finally, an important Commercial Speech case last term was 44
5
Liquormart v. Rhode Island,1
a case that questioned the parameters of the

Central Hudson6 "special care" test for infringements on commercial speech.
This term the Court returns to the Central Hudson test in another commercial
speech case to consider whether compelled speech should be analyzed under the

same test as suppressed speech. 7 Thus, a number of business-related cases
involve continuing sagas which transcend the boundaries of specific Court terms
and will eventually yield more evidence of trends and patterns in cases that
have a substantial impact on business interests.

11. See O'Gilvie v. United States, 117 S. Ct 452 (1996). In this case, plaintiffs challenged taxes assessed against a $10 million punitive damage award. O'Gilvie died of toxic shock syndrome. See id. at 454.
The gravamen of the case was a claim of wrongful-death against International Playtex, Inc. See id. The issue
before the Court was whether punitives are excludable from gross income under Section 104(a)(2) of the
Internal Revenue Code because they are received "on account of" personal injuries. See id. The government
argued that only compensatory damages are within the purview of that Section. See, Marcia Coyle, High
Court Business Cases May Cost Companies More, NAT'L W., Oct. 7, 1996, at B-1. The court, by a 6 to 3
vote, agreed. See O'Gilvie, 117 S. Ct. at 454.
12. 116 S. Ct. 2374 (1996).
13. See id. at 2380.
14. See Turner Broad. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994) (holding that the "must carry" rules are subject to
intermediate scrutiny and it remanded to a 3-judge district court panel for consideration of the nature of the
government's interest in "must-carry" requirements). The Court described intermediate level scrutiny as imposing upon the government the burden of showing that "must-carry" does not infringe upon First Amendment rights "substantially more than necessary to further important governmental interests." Id. at 2469-70.
15. 116 S. Ct 1495 (1996).
16. Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
17. See Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc. v. Espy, 58 F.3d 1367 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. granted, Glickman v.
Wileman Bros. & Elliot,'Inc., 116 S. Ct 1875 (1996) (No. 95-1184). At issue in Wileman is the 1937 Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act which, inter alia, assesses a fee on fruit handlers (those who produce and
market fruit) to cover an annual advertising budget. See Wileman, 58 F.3d at 1372. The Ninth Circuit applied
Central Hudson's three-pronged test for suppression of conmercial speech and found that the assessment
(deemed "compelled speech") did not pass Constitutional muster. See id. at 1379-80. The government argued
that the Circuit's reliance on CentralHudson is misplaced in cases of compelled (as opposed to suppressed)
speech. See id. at 1377-78. It argued that the proper test for the constitutionality of compelled speech is found
in Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1 (1990). Keller held that the state bar association at issue was more
analogous to the labor union in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209 (1977), than to a government agency; therefore mandatory dues can be used to finance activities "necessarily or reasonably incurred for the purpose of regulating the legal profession ... " Keller, 496 U.S. at 14. By contrast, government
agencies may tax and, otherwise, assess fees even against those who disagree with the purpose for which the
funds are raised. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 259 (1982).
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Viewed separately, even a single term is revelatory of the Court's view of
private sector issues. This paper considers a random sample of business-related
issues the Court heard last term: issues pertaining to compensatory and punitive
damages; pre-emption and the Commerce Clause, ERISA (Employee Retirement
Income Security Act); Anti-trust, Labor and Employment. It reaches the conclusion that the term could quite accurately be characterized as moderately probusiness. However, it is important to notice that this posture is evidenced not
only by the decisions the Court reached in particular cases but also by the particular cases the Court chose to consider. That is to say, that while a close
reading of the forty business-related cases creates a clear impression of a moderate, pragmatic and centrist Court, a Court that is developing a distinctive
consensus on business sector issues, the question remains the extent to which
this moderation is attributable to a deliberate selection of "easier" cases-cases
that do not exacerbate pre-existing ideological splits in the Court'---rather
than to the resolution of the issues it actually considered. Was this moderate,
apparently, centrist visage pre-ordained by the docket? In the long run, a retrospective of the business-related cases the Court chose to reject may be the best
mechanism for making this evaluation. 9
II. DAMAGE AWARDS

Last term, perhaps the case with the highest profile was BMW v. Gore.2"
In Gore, the Court, for the first time, struck down a punitive damages award,
holding that it was grossly excessive in violation of the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment."
Plaintiff Gore bought a new BMW from an authorized dealer but he subsequently discovered that it had been repainted by the manufacturer to cover salt
water damage the car suffered in transatlantic shipment.' BMW acknowledged
that it had a policy of not advising its dealers or customers of pre-delivery
damage when the cost of repair did not exceed 3 percent of the car's retail
prce.'
Gore alleged this practice violated Alabama's fraud statute because the
failure to disclose amounted to suppression of a material fact." The jury
agreed and awarded Gore $4,000 in compensatory damages (the amount by
which it calculated the value of the car to be reduced) and $4 million in

18. By way of example, in labor law cases the Court was almost entirely pro-union. See infra notes 110
through 139 and accompanying text. However, as will be discussed below the issues in most of those cases
were only marginally doctrinal and did not trigger ideological disputes of broad national interest or significance.
19. Many commentators have been frustrated by the Court's refusal to hear cases involving important
business-related issues. See, e.g., remarks by Roy Englert, a practicing attorney, in Coyle, supra note 11.
20. 116 S. Ct. 1589 (1996).
21. See id. at 1598.
22. See id. at 1592 n.l.
23. See id. at 1593.
24. See id.
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punitives8 The trial court expressly held that the punitives award was not so
excessive as to violate due process and the Alabama Supreme Court agreed. 26
But it reduced the award to $2 million because it believed that the jury had
improperly calculated the damages by multiplying the compensatory award by
similar sales of BMW's in all states, not just in Alabama2 The Supreme
Court reversed and remanded.
Justice Stevens delivered the opinion in which Justices O'Connor, Kennedy
and Souter joined and Justice Breyer concurred. 8 Justices O'Connor and
Souter joined in the concurrence 9 Justice Thomas joined Justice Scalia's dissent; the Chief Justice joined Justice Ginsberg's dissent."
Justice Stevens began by asserting that "'the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a state from imposing a "grossly excessive"
punishment on a tortfeasor. ''3 . And he set out three guideposts by which to
measure excessiveness. The first guidepost is the extent of the state's reasonable
and legitimate interests in protecting its own consumers.3 2 Justice Stevens
found that the award exceeded Alabama's legitimate interest in protecting its
citizens from deceptive trade practices and he concluded that, for the following
reasons, BMW could not have reasonably anticipated a penalty of this magnitude for its conduct?3 The harm inflicted on Alabama consumers was purely
economic: the repainting itself did not affect the car's performance, its safety
features or even its appearance. 4 BMW's conduct evinced no reckless disregard for Alabama consumers' safety nor did its conduct involve fraudulent
misrepresentations. Thus, the extent of the state's legitimate interest in protecting citizens from this kind of harm was minimal, compared to the size of the
exemplary damages imposed.35
The second guidepost of excessiveness is the ratio between plaintiff's
compensatory damages and the amount of the punitive award.36 Here, the $2
million in punitives was 500 times the amount of Gore's actual harm. And
while the Court refused to draw a bright line of mathematical certainty, it found
that a ratio of 500 to 1, under these facts, was clearly excessive.37
The third guidepost for excessiveness requires a court to compare this
award with civil or criminal sanctions that could be imposed in the jurisdiction
for comparable misconduct. The comparable sanction in Alabama is a fine of

25. See id. at 1593-94.
26. See id.at 1594.
27. See id. at 1595.
28. See id.at 1592.
29. See id.
30. See id.
31. See id. at 1592 (quoting TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 454 (1993)).
32. See Gore, 116 S. Ct. at 1598. Justice Stevens described the first guidepost as "the degree of
reprehensibility of the non-disclosure." Id.
33. See id.at 1599.
34. See id.at 1596.
35. See id at 1598-1601.
36. See id.at 1601.
37. See id.at 1601-03.
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$2,000--dramatically lower than the $2 million award in this case.38 Justice
Stevens concluded that the award met none of the three guidelines.39
Justice Scalia took a predictably textualist approach, dissenting on the
grounds that the Constitution does not make the size of a punitive award in
state court a cognizable issue.' All the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees,
said Scalia, is a process by which a defendant may contest the award in state
court." He argued that the Court's decision goes beyond the purview of that
procedural guarantee and confers a substantive due process right on defendants.42
Justice Ginsberg took a more pragmatic approach. She dissented on the
basis that the opinion unnecessarily invades state law territory, in light of the
recent trend among state legislatures to provide statutory caps on punitive damages.43 And she cited title 23, section 9.1(B)-(D) of the Oklahoma Statutes as
an example.'
One could argue that Ginsberg's point is well taken: for the reason she
advanced, the case is practically sui generis. It won't have a significant impact
on state jury awards because of the trend toward legislative caps." Nevertheless, Gore was a decision that gave the business community comfort.
As did the other case on damages last term-this one concerning compensatory damages awards: Gasperini v. Center for the Humanities.' Gasperini, a
journalist and photographer, loaned 300 original slide transparencies to the
Center and the Center lost them.47 Gasperini filed suit in federal district court
in New York invoking diversity jurisdiction.' The jury awarded Gasperini
$1500 per slide for a total of $450,000 in compensatory damages." The Center
moved for a new trial, asserting that under New York law the award was
excessive in that it "deviated materially" from what would be considered reasonable compensation. 5' The federal district court denied the Center's motion
without comment.5 2 And the Second Circuit reversed on the grounds that the

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

See The Alabama Deceptive Trade Practices Act, ALA. CODE § 8-19-11(b) (1993).
See Gore, 116 S. Ct. at 1602-1604.
See id. at 1610 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
See id.
See id. at 1611.

43. See id. at 1614 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
44. See id. at 1618.

45. Another point is also germane: Alabama is infamous in corporate circles for the magnitude of
punitives it routinely awards. Statistics gathered by Prof. George Priest of Yale Law School from 1989-1996
indicate that punitives for non-wrongful death cases in Alabama averaged $3.3 million. See Wendy R.
Leibowitz, $33M Award Is an Average Ala. Punitive, NAT'L L., Dec. 23, 1996, at A-6. And the discrepancy
between awards assessed against in state and out-of-state defendants was marked: $961,045 versus
$6,382,360, on the average. See id.
46. 116 S.Ct. 2211 (1996).
47. See id. at 2215.
48. See id. at 2216.
49. See id.
50. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 5501(c) (McKinney 1995).
51. See Gasperini,116 S. Ct. at 2216.
52. See id.
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district court's denial was "an abuse of discretion" because, under section
5501(c) the award was clearly excessive. 3
When the matter reached the Supreme Court, the issue was whether there
was an irreconcilable conflict between a federal appellate court's application of
the New York cap (on the one hand) and the 7th Amendment stricture that
federal courts not re-examine facts tried by a jury (on the other hand).,4 Justice
Ginsberg delivered the opinion of the Court. Justice Scalia filed a dissent in
which Justices Thomas and Rehnquist joinedV s
The initial inquiry for the Court was whether a federal district
court-sitting in diversity-must apply the New York law. That issue devolves
to the question of whether the New York law (which directs appellate courts to
order new trials when jury verdicts are excessive), is "substantive" or "procedural" under the Erie doctrine. 6 Recall that, according to Erie, federal courts
sitting in diversity apply state substantive law and federal procedural law and
that, according to Erie and its progeny, "substantive" is generally described as
"outcome determinative." ' The Supreme Court applied the test and found that
the New York law was, indeed, substantive; therefore federal courts were bound
by it.
That answer gives rise to the next question: does application of the New
York law run afoul of the Seventh Amendment command that precludes federal
judicial review of jury findings other than "according to the rules of the common law." ' 8 Or, put another way, is there a constitutionally acceptable path
between the Scylla59 of the New York law and the Charybdis ° of the Seventh
Amendment? Justice Ginsberg found that there was: by permitting federal appellate courts to apply the New York law under an abuse-of-discretion standard-focusing on the trial court's exercise of its discretion rather than on the
jury's conduct in making the award.6
Justice Scalia again dissented on textualist grounds: he declared that the
Court's decision nullifies a core component of the Bill of Rights: Seventh
Amendment protection against re-examination of jury awards.62 The Chief Jus-

53. See id.
54. See id. at 2222.
55. See id. at 2214.
56. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
57. See Gasperini,116 S. Ct. at 2219-20 (1996). See also Guaranty Trust v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945)
(concluding that "outcome determinative" requires a showing that the law have a significant effect on the
result of the litigation). But see, Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965) (holding that the test is not to be
mechanically applied).
58. See Gasperini, 116 S. Ct. at 2220-22.
59. A nymph changed into a monster in Greek mythology who terrorizes mariners in the Strait of
Massina-between Scylla and Charybdis: between two equally hazardous alternatives. See ,VEBsTER's NInrH
NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1057 (1984).
60. A whirlpool off the coast of Sicily personified in Greek myth as a female monster. See WEBsTER's
NImr NEw COLLEGIATE DIcTIoNARY, supra note 59, at 228.
61. See Gasperini, 116 S. Ct. at 2223-25.
62. See id. at 2229-30 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
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tice and Justice Thomas agreed with that view. Justice Stevens dissented on
separate grounds.63
Last term saw the Court reaching decisions which had the effect of imposing limits on both compensatory and punitive damages awards. Thus, in Gore
and in Gasperinithe position taken by the Court should be considered to give
solace to the business community.
I.

PRE-EMPTION AND THE COMMERCE CLAUSE

The business community did not fare quite so well in pre-emption and
Commerce Clause cases. BarnettBank v. Nelson' is emblematic of an interesting metamorphosis in the law: court and agency-driven incremental breaking
down of barriers previously erected by U.S. law to segregate certain types of
business activity-in this case, the commercial banking industry and the insurance business. The dissolution of these barriers is, in large part, a response to
our economy's global competition with foreign companies that do not operate
under similar legal constraints.'
In Barnett Bank the legal constraint was a Florida law that prohibited
national banks with affiliates in small towns from acting as insurance agents in
those towns.' A unanimous Court found that the Florida statute was preempted by a federal statute which expressly permitted national banks to engage
in small town insurance business.67 And because the federal statute expressly
covered the insurance business, the Court held that the Florida statute was not
saved from pre-emption by the McCarran-Ferguson Act.6" The Court noted
that McCarran-Ferguson decrees that federal statutes do not pre-empt state law
regulating insurance unless the federal statute specifically relates to the business
of insurance, as this federal statute did.69 Barnett Bank represents a win for the
banking business and a loss for the insurance business.
The Supreme Court also found that a federal statute requiring arbitration
clauses in contracts to be treated with parity in relation to other contract provisions70 pre-empted a Montana statute7' that treated arbitration clauses differently (requiring that they be printed in bold letters, among other things.)'
63. See id. at 2225-30 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
64. 116 S. Ct. 1103 (1996).

65. For a recent discussion of the ramifications of Barnett Bank, see Marianne Levelle, Comptroller
Expands Bank Powers, NAT'L LJ., Dec. 9, 1996, B-1 (noting that in the absence of a Congressional imprimatur, blessing the entry of bankl into previously forbidden territory (like the insurance and securities investment
businesses) the same result has been achieved through reinterpretation of existing law by agency and judicial
fiat.). For a more thorough discussion of this -issue, see Mark J. Roe, Some Differences in Corporate Structure
in Germany, Japan and the United States, 102 YALE LJ. 1927 (1993).
66. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 626.988(2) (West 1996).

67. See 12 U.S.C. § 92 (1994).
68. See 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1994).
69. See Barnett Bank, 116 S. Ct. at II10.
70. See The Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
71. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-5-114(4) (1995).

72. See id; see also, Doctor's Assoc. v. Casarotto, 116 S. Ct. 1652, 1655 (1996) (involving a dispute
over the arbitration clause in a standard form Subway Sandwich Shop franchise agreement).
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Federal law also pre-empted state law in a credit card case. In Smiley v.
Citibankr the petitioner, a resident of California, held credit cards with a national bank located in South Dakota. South Dakota law permitted banks to
charge late fees on credit card payments;74 but California law did not!5 The
Court first interpreted the National Bank Act of 186476 to permit national
banks to charge late fees by characterizing them as permissible "interest" on
loans. 7 The Court then went on to hold that the 1864 Act pre-empted California law.78 Smiley represents another win for the banking industry.
The leading pre-emption case last term was Medtronic.9 In Medtronic the
Court found that federal law did not pre-empt state law remedies for negligence."0 The federal law at issue was the 1976 Medical Device Amendments
to the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938." The 1976 Act required premarket approval of new medical devices but it grandfathered in devices already
on the market and new devices that were "substantially equivalent" to devices
already on the market.'
Only a limited FDA review of "substantially equivalent" devices was required. It was pursuant to this expedited review process that the pacemaker at
issue in this case reached the market and, eventually, the injured plaintiff. Plaintiff sued under traditional state tort theories. 3 The Court was asked to consider
whether this expedited process pre-empted the state law remedies for negligent
design and manufacturer and for failure to warn.84 By a 5-4 decision, the Court
held that it did not.s
The plurality noted that under traditional pre-emption analysis, state remedies grounded in police power regulation enjoy a presumption against pre-emption.86 These remedies are not pre-empted unless Congress manifests its intent
to pre-empt. And while the Medical Device Act did have a pre-emption provision, the plurality decided that the pre-emptive language in the Act precluded
only state regulation, not necessarily state remedies. In this context, given the
fact that the common law remedies in no way interfered with the federal
scheme, the plurality found that the common law remedies were not preempted.88

73. 116 S. Ct. 1730 (1996).
74. See S.D. CODwED LAWS §§ 54-3-1, 54-3-1.1 (Michie 1990).
75. See Smiley, 116 S. CL at 1732.
76. See 12 U.S.C. § 85 (1994).
77. See Smiley, 116 S. Ct. at 1732-35 (the Court deferred to the interpretation of the Comptroller of the
Currency that "interest" for purposes of § 85 includes late payment fees).
78. See id. at 1735.
79. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 116 S. Ct. 2240 (1996).

80. See id. at 2257.
81. See id. at 2245.
82. See id. at 2246.
83. See id. at 2248.

84. See id. at 2245.
85. See id.
86. See id. at 2245, 2250.
87. See id. at 2251-58.

88. See id. at 2258.
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This case could be viewed as a loss for business-and surely it was for the
manufacturer of the pacemaker in this case. On the other hand, this case was
distinctive, involving as it did a unique statute which gave the FDA only limited review of these medical devices-a statute which did not establish federal
design requirements except for the "substantially equivalent" standard. It is a
case which may be inapplicable to most other cases raising pre-emption issues. 9 Medtronic failed to establish clear guidelines for when federal regulations will pre-empt traditional state remedies for tortious conduct.
Undoubtedly, the issue will continue to be debated on a case specific basis.
One aspect of the case that will give the plaintiff's bar pause is the express
statement by five justices that common law remedies can be pre-empted, just as
state regulations can, and that implied pre-emption can exist along with, and in
addition to, express pre-emption.' Consequently, in terms of patterns and
trends, Medironic is not an anti-business decision.
Finally, under this category of cases, the Court struck down a state law
9 1 a unanimous Court
pursuant to the Commerce Clause. In Fulton v. Faulkner,
applied the dormant Commerce Clause, which forecloses the ability of states to
institute economic protectionism by way of legislation. The Court struck down
a North Carolina intangibles tax levied on the fair market value of corporate
stock owned by North Carolina residents.' The Court struck down the tax because the tax exempted the stock of corporations that did all of their business in
North Carolina.' North Carolina was unable to justify this facially protectionist law.94 Justice Souter, writing for a unanimous Court, found this protectionist policy impermissible under the Commerce Clause.95 Fulton represents a loss
for local business, but a win for interstate business. Thus, the cases in this category were a mixed bag for business.
IV. ERISA
The Court analyzed three ERISA 96 cases last term and in two of them
employers were able to avoid liability to employee-beneficiaries.
In Lockheed Corp. v. Spink,7' a reinstated employee argued that
Lockheed's early retirement plan amounted to a "prohibited transaction" because the employer had an inherent self-interest in conditioning early retirement
benefits on the employee's release of any claims he may have had against the
employer.98 The Court found that Lockheed was merely a plan sponsor, not a

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

See, Mark I. Levy, High Court Takes Care of Business, NAT'L L., July 29, 1996, at C-8.
See id.
116S. Ct. 848 (1996).
See id. at 852.
See id. at 856, 861.
See id. at 860.
See id. at 856.
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994).
116S. Ct. 1783 (1996).
See id. at 1786.

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol32/iss3/6

10

1997]

Bucholtz: Taking Care of Business: A Review of Business-Related Cases in th
BUSINESS-RELATED CASES

plan fiduciary and that its quid pro quo offer to retirees was not impermissible
under ERISA. 9
The Court also found that the 1986 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
which amended ERISA to prohibit age discrimination in qualified plans was
made expressly prospective by its language."
Similarly, in Peacock v. Thomas,'°' a controlling shareholder of a judgment proof corporation avoided personal liability for the corporation's breach of
its fiduciary duties.'" The Court found the shareholder was not a plan fiduciary and it stated there is no independent cause of action under ERISA for piercing the corporate veil in order to reach him under an alter ego theory. 3
By contrast, in Varity v. Howe,'" the Court did find an actionable breach
of fiduciary duty under ERISA and the facts in Varity make it abundantly clear
why the Court reached that conclusion. In Varity, the employer-company was a
fiduciary, operating and administering its own plan." 5 When it saw that several of its divisions were failing financially, it devised a scheme to dodge a number of financial obligation bullets. First, it transferred all of the failing divisions
into one newly created shell corporation."'6 Then it persuaded the employers
of those divisions to switch their employer from those existing divisions to the
new shell, thereby releasing the employer from obligations under pre-existing
plans."'° And it did so by fraudulently misrepresenting the financial prospects
of the new shell which were, in fact, nil."' The Court held the conduct violated § 404(a) of ERISA, misconduct which is actionable under § 502(a)(3)."'°
V. ANTI-TRUST, LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT
In other employment cases, business lost to the unions fairly consistently.
The only win for business in this arena was against the pro-football players'
union-in an anti-trust case: Brown v. Pro Football,Inc." °
In 1987, following the expiration of their collective bargaining agreement,
the NFL and the Players Association initiated contract negotiations."' One of
the terms under discussion was a proposal by the clubs which would permit
them to pay their rookie squads an across-the-board $1,000 per week per rookie.' The players argued rookies should have the same right to negotiate their

99. See id. at 1789-92.
100. See id. at 1792-93.
101. 116 S. Ct. 862 (1996).

102. See id. at 865.
103.
104.
105.
106.

See id. at 869.
116 S. C. 1065 (1996).
See id. at 1067-69.
See id. at 1068.

107. See id. at 1068-69.
108. See id.
109.
110.
Ill.
112.

See id. at 1074.
116 S. Ct. 2116 (1996).
See id. at 2119.
See id.
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individual salaries that other players had."' Negotiations reached an impasse
because of this issue, whereupon the clubs implemented their plan unilaterally." 4 The players argued that this concerted action was in restraint of trade,
and an anti-trust violation. The Court found that the clubs were exempt from
anti-trust liability, in this instance, because their actions were instituted only
after an impasse in good faith collective bargaining occurred and they were
implementing their "last best good faith wage offer."".5 Simply put, the Court
invoked the labor law exemption to anti-trust law. In a vigorous dissent, Justice
Stevens argued this application of the labor law exemption was misplaced,
inappropriate and an invitation to employers to stonewall and, then, having
brought collective bargaining to impasse, to engage in concerted action, no
matter how offensive the action might be to anti-trust policy or how tenuous its
claim to good faith bargaining." 6
In other labor cases, however, the unions fared much better. In Holly
Farms Corp. v. NLRB" 7 for example, the Court was asked to characterize the
status of workers who provide bridging services between independent contractors and the corporations they serve: were these workers covered by the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA") or not? Holly Farms is a vertically integrated
poultry producer and subsidiary of Tyson Foods. Holly Farms processes the
poultry for market but it outsources the actual raising of the poultry to independent contractor farms."' The question for the Court was whether the workers
who catch the chickens (after they have been raised by the farmers) and the
workers who deliver them to Holly Farms' processing plant are "employees" of
Holly Farms (who pays their wages)." 9 The Court had to decide whether the
workers were covered by the NLRA as "employees" or excluded from NLRA
coverage as "agricultural laborers" (because their actual work-catching chickens-is done "on the farm").' A divided Court found that because these two
groups of workers did not perform agricultural tasks they were covered by the
NLRA. Therefore, they were part of the collective bargaining unit of the
processing plant.'"
NLRB v. Town & Country Electric, Inc." was another pro-Union case
that also extended the term "employee" under the Act: this time to cover employees who were simultaneously being paid by the union organizers and by the

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

See id.
See id.
See id. at 2123-26.
See id. at 2128-35 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
116 S. Ct. 1396 (1996).
See id. at 1399-1400.
See id. at 1400.
See id.
See id. at 1406.
See id.
116 S. Ct. 450 (1995).
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company as electricians.'24 The Court, in effect, said a man can serve two
masters."a
United Food & Commercial Workers Union v. Brown Group, Inc.s was
another pro-union case. Here, the Court conferred standing on the Union to sue
on behalf of its membership under the federal Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (WARN)." The company argued that the Union could
not meet the third prong of the modem standing test for associations." The
third prong of that test, as enunciated in Hunt v. Washington State Apple Commission," states that the relief requested must not require the participation of
individual members. 3 ' Because in United Food the proof of damages was discrete to each member, members' participation in fashioning the remedy was
required. The Supreme Court found that the third prong of the Hunt test was
not constitutionally mandated but was merely included for reasons of prudence
and judicial efficiency; therefore it could and should be abrogated in this
3
case.' '

The Court was sympathetic to the union's position in Auciello Iron Works,
Inc. v. NLRB, 3 1 as well. A unanimous Court found that an employer engaged
in an unfair labor practice under the NLRA when it refused to sign the contract
it had proposed to the Union and the Union had already accepted.'3 3 The employer argued that its refusal to sign its own contract was premised on its
doubts that the Union had majority support. 34 The Court found that once an
employer offers a new contract, with
notice of the facts that give rise to its
35
late.
too
comes
defense
doubts, this
Finally, in O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers, Inc.,'36 a unanimous
Court said that under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 37 the fact
that a plaintiff, allegedly terminated on the basis of age, is replaced by a person
who is also in the protected class will not defeat his claim.' The pivotal fact
and proper focus of the inquiry is not the age 39of his replacement, but whether
he was, indeed, terminated because of his age.

124. See id. at 457.

125. See id. at 456 (emphasis in original).
126. 116 S. Ct. 1529 (1996).
127. 29 U.S.C. § 2101 (1996).
128. See United Food, 116 S. Ct. at 1536.
129. 432 U.S. 333 (1977).
130. See id. at 343. The Court stated the three prongs of the test as follows:
(a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to
protect are germane to the organization's purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief
requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit.

Id.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
-137.
138.

See United Food, 116 S. Ct. at 1536.
116 S. Ct. 1754 (1996).
See id.at 1760-61.
See id. at 1760.
See id. at 1758.
116 S. Ct. 1307 (1996).
29 U.S.C. § 621 (1996).
See O'Connor116 S. Ct. at 1310.

139. See id.
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V1. CONCLUSION

In sum, as these union and employee cases attest, while last term was a
pro-business term overall, it was only moderately pro-business. A final thought:
should the holdings of last term's cases be the sole litmus test of the current
Court's disposition towards business related cases? As noted above, several of
these cases are virtually sui generis,'" while others resolve issues that impact
only small segments of society.'41 Perhaps the better questions might be: what
business-related cases did the Court decline to hear and why? Answers to those
questions might lead to a deeper understanding of the Rehnquist Court's
mindset at mid-decade.

140. See, e.g., Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 116 S. Ct. 2240 (1996).
141. See, e.g., Holly Farms Corp. v. NLRB, 116 S. Ct. 1396 (1996).
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APPENDIX A
1995-1996 TERM
SUPREME COURT CASES
IMPACTING THE
Field/Rule of Law
Cases

BUsINESS COMMUNrTY

Authored Unani- IFavor- jKind of Business Interest Competing interest in
by
mous? able to
this case was:
I business?
Ib

1. Punitive and
Compensatory Damages
__Gore

Stevens

no

yes

car dealer

consumer (economic

interest)
-Gasperini
lI.Commercial Speech;
First Amendment Telecommunications

Ginsberg

no

yes

photography

tortfeasor

_Umbehr

O'Connor no

yes

trash hauling
independent contractors

government as employer

-Denver Area

Breyer

no

yes

cable operators

federal regulations to
protect children from
pornography

-44 Liquormart

Stevens

no

yes

retail advertisers

state regulations to promote temperance

_O'Hare Truck, Serv.

Kennedy

no

yes

towing serviceindependent contractors

government as employer

Barnett Bank

Breyer

yes

n/a

bank

state law; insurance
agencies

Casarotto

Ginsberg

no

n/a

franchise

state law

-Medtronic

Stevens

no

no

manufacturer

consumers

_Smiley

Scalia

yes

yes

bank

credit card holder

__Fulton

Souter

yes

yes

out of state corp.

state treasury; in-state
corps.

Thomas

no

yes

employer as plan sponsor beneficiaries

Thomas

no

yes

employer as plan sponsor beneficiaries

Breyer

yes

n/a

employer as plan fiduciary

Ill. Pre-emption; commerce clause

IV. ERISA
-Spink
_Peacock
Varity Corp.
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V. Bankruptcy
__Strumpf

Scalia

yes

yes

creditor-bank

bankrupt

Mans

Souter

no

yes

creditor

bankrupt

Things Remembered

Thomas

yes

no

commercial lessee

commercial lessor

Souter

yes

no

ch.1 1 debtor corp.

IRS

no

yes

ch.11 debtor corp.

IRS

yes

n/a

patent on dry cleaning
systems

competitor's system

Rehnquist no

no

chemical manufacturing

federal government

Souter

no

yes

investors

federal government

Kennedy

no

yes

towing serv.

government as employers

-Umbehr
VIII. Antitrust

O'Connor no

yes

trash hauler

government as employer

Brown
IX. Labor, employment

Breyer

no

yes

professional football

players' union

__Holly Farms

Ginsberg

no

no

Poultry industry

unions

-Town & Country
Elee.

Breyer

yes

no

electric

unions

-United Food & Com- Souter
mercial Workers

yes

no

food industry

unions

Souter

yes

no

manufacturing

unions

Scalia

yes

no

n/a

employee

Thomas

no

yes

takeover bidder and

target shareholders

_Noland

CF&I Fabricators
Souter
VI. Intellectual Property
Westview Instruments Souter
VII. Government Contracts
_Hercules Inc.
Winstar
-O'Hare Truck

Anciello Ironworks
-Consolidated Coin
X. Jurisdiction: Procedure & Class Action
-- )Epstein

board
-Quackenbush

O'Connor yes

yes

insurance

reinsurer

Thomas

yes

n/a

commercial lessee

commercial lessor

_Henderson
Ginsberg
XI. Maritime; Admiralty;
and Aviation

yes

n/a

n/a

federal government

-Sofec

yes

n/a

oil tanker

manufacturers of moor-

Things Remembered

Thomas

ings
--Henderson

Ginsberg

yes

n/a

n/a

federal government

-Yamaha Motor

Ginsberg

yes

no

manufacturer

injured consumer

Scalia

yes

yes

airline

passenger and his heirs

_Korean Airlines
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XII.Railroads

__Bhd. of Locomotive
Engineers

Kennedy

yes

yes

railroads

labor

_Norfolk & Western
XIII. Environment

Thomas

yes

yes

railroads

labor

KFC Western
XIV. Banking

O'Connor yes

In/a

landowner

prior polluter

__Bank One Chicago

Ginsberg

yes

n/a

depositee bank

depositor bank

Scalia

yes

yes

bank

credit card holder

.Barnett Bank
XV. Taxation

Breyer

yes

n/a

bank

insurance agencies

--Lundy

O'Connor no

no

n/a

IRS

_Jefferson County

Stevens

yes

yes

n/a

state treasury

__I.B.M.

Thomas

no

yes

exporter

IRS

.. Reorganized CF&I
Fabricators

Souter

no

yes

ch. 11 debtor corporation IRS

._Fulton

Souter

yes

yes

out of state corporation

-Smiley

state treasure; in-state
,corps.

APPENDIX B
List of Cases
Punitive and Compensatory damages
1.
BMW v. Gore, 116 S. CL 1589 (1996).
2.
Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, 116 S. CL 2211 (1996).
Commercial
1.
2.
3.
4.

Speech; First Amendment; and Telecommunications
Board of Comm'rs of Wabaunsee County v. Umbehr, 116 S. Ct. 2342 (1996).
Denver Area Educ. Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 116 S. CL 2374 (1996).
44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495 (1996).
O'Hare Truck Serv. v. Northlake, 116 S. CL 2353 (1996).

Pre-emption;
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Commerce Clause
Barnett Bank v. Nelson, 116 S. Ct. 1103 (1996).
Doctor's Associates v. Casarotto, 116 S. CL 1652 (1996).
Medtronic v. Lohr, 116 S. Ct. 2240 (1996).
Smiley v. Citibank, 116 S. Ct. 1730 (1996).
Fulton v. Faulkner, 116 S. Ct. 848 (1996).

Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)
1.
Lockheed Corp v. Spink, 116 S. CL 1783 (1996).
2.
Peacock v. Thomas, 116 S. CL 862 (1996).
3.
Varity Corp v. Howe, 116 S. CL 1065 (1996).
Bankruptcy
1.
Citizens Bank of Maryland v. Strumpf, 116 S. Ct. 286 (1995).
2.
Field v. Mans, 116 S. Ct. 437 (1995).
Things Remembered v. Petrarca, 116 S. Ct. 494 (1995).
3.
United States v. Noland, 116 S. Ct. 1524 (1996).
4.
United States v. Reorganized CF&I Fabricators, 116 S. Ct. 2106 (1996).
5.
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Intellectual Property
1.
Markman v. Westview Instruments, 116 S. Ct. 1384 (1996).
Government
1.
2.
3.
4.

Contracts
Hercules Inc. v. U.S., 116 S. Ct. 981 (1996).
United States v. Winstar, 116 S. Ct. 2432 (1996).
O'Hare Truck, supra.
Umbehr, supra.

Antitrust
1.

Brown v. Pro Football, 116 S. Ct. 2116 (1996).

Labor, Employment
1.
Holly Farms Corp v. NLRB, 116 S. Ct. 1396 (1996).
2.
NLRB v. Town & Country Elec., 116 S. Ct. 450 (1995).
3.
United Food & Commercial Workers v. Brown Group, 116 S. Ct. 1529 (1996).
4.
Auciello Ironworks v. NLRB, 116 S. Ct. 1754 (1996).
5.
O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers, 116 S. Ct. 1307 (1996).
Jurisdiction;
1.
2.
3.
4.

Procedure; and Class Actions
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 116 S. Ct. 873 (1996).
Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 116 S. Ct. 1712 (1996).
Things Remembered, supra.
Henderson v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1638 (1996).

Maritime; Admiralty; and Aviation
1.
Exxon Co. U.S.A. v. Sofec, 116 S. Ct. 1813 (1996).
2.
Henderson, supra.
3.
Yamaha Motor Corp v. Calhoun, 116 S. Ct. 619 (1996).
4.
Zicherman v. Korean Airlines Co., 116 S. Ct. 629 (1996).
Railroads
1.
Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers v. Santa Fe R.R., 116 S. Ct. 595 (1996).
2.
Norfolk & Western Ry Co. v. Hiles, 116 S. Ct. 890 (1996).
Environment
1.
Meghrig v. KFC Western, 116 S. Ct. 1251 (1996).
Banking
1.
2.
3.

Bank One Chicago v. Midwest Bank & Trust, 116 S. Ct. 637 (1996).
Smiley, supra.
BarnettBank, supra.

Taxation
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Comm'r v. Lundy, 116 S. Ct. 647 (1996).
Richards v. Jefferson County, 116 S. Ct. 1761 (1996).
United States v. I.B.M., 116 S. Ct. 1793 (1996).
Reorganized CF & I Fabricaters,supra.
Fulton v. Faulkner,supra.
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